The political stalemate following the Swedish elections of September 2026 brings to mind the work of Swedish economist Knut Wicksell. Drawing on the so-called Wicksellian connection provides a useful framework for understanding several important features of the present political and economic environment. At its core lies the relationship between public expenditure, taxation and political consent: citizens are more likely to accept taxation when public spending is transparent, accountable and sufficiently justified. Hayek developed this concern further, arguing that progressive taxation could become politically distorted, gradually shifting an increasing share of the fiscal burden onto a shrinking proportion of the population (Goodspeed, 2012).

This question of consent has become particularly relevant in contemporary Sweden. The growing number of people who have received citizenship under comparatively lenient conditions has contributed, in the view of many Swedish conservatives, to a larger population of insufficiently integrated migrants who participate in the welfare state without necessarily assuming what conservatives understand as the full obligations of citizenship. This group is consequently perceived by parts of the Swedish right as an electoral barrier to the implementation of conservative governance and as a constituency deliberately mobilised by its political opponents (Le Monde, 2026).

By extension, this reaction can be understood as part of a broader resistance to progressive political ideas, with migration policy based on vaguely defined humanitarian principles becoming the most immediate target. The result is not only growing distrust toward progressive politics but the gradual formation of a more coherent political agenda against it. From a conservative perspective, this reaction is also consistent with resistance to decentralised political structures that weaken state authority. At the same time, economic protectionist policies that have become increasingly prominent in the United States remain less acceptable within the Swedish political mainstream.

The political importance attached to diversity, equity and inclusion programmes illustrates this wider ideological divide. The previous dispute between Stockholm City Council and the United States Embassy over anti-DEI requirements demonstrated how questions that originated primarily within American domestic politics could acquire diplomatic and economic significance abroad (The Independent, 2025). From a conservative perspective, this suggests that both social and economic conservatism have increasingly been marginalised within sections of European political life.

Simultaneously, confidence in social democracy has declined in a country historically regarded as one of its most successful political examples. Sweden is particularly important in this respect because social democracy has long been central to the country’s political identity. The 2026 election result indicates that the traditional centre has increasingly been squeezed between more ideologically defined political forces, while the small electoral difference between competing blocs demonstrates how sharply divided Swedish society has become (International Viewpoint, 2026).

The reliance of left-of-centre parties on immigrant voters may also prove strategically short-sighted. Many migrant communities retain socially conservative attitudes that, under different political conditions, could align them more naturally with conservative parties. Some may therefore regard the political parties currently seeking their support as temporary vehicles rather than permanent ideological homes. In such circumstances, migrant and Muslim identities become politically significant, potentially reducing the incentives for rapid assimilation and reinforcing the political importance of distinct communal identities.

The Decline of the Post-War Centre

After the Second World War, centre-left and centre-right parties emerged as the dominant political forces across much of Western Europe. Political and security considerations, expressed economically through instruments such as the Marshall Plan, helped form the basis of the modern European institutional order and demonstrated that political cooperation remained possible among actors with substantial ideological differences (Council on Foreign Relations).

The stability and prosperity of post-war Western Europe were, to a considerable extent, associated with the emergence of moderate political actors capable of compromise. Today, however, the political centre is increasingly challenged by progressive ideological movements on one side and a revived conservative or populist right on the other. A comparable process is visible in the United States, where moderate and progressive factions of the Democratic Party continue to compete over the party’s direction ahead of the midterm elections (Euronews, 2026).

This political fragmentation must also be understood alongside changes in the transatlantic security relationship. At the 2025 Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President JD Vance made clear that Europe could no longer assume that the United States would treat European security as an unlimited strategic obligation. His intervention reflected a wider American expectation that European states must assume a greater share of the burden for their own security (Munich Security Conference, 2025).

The consequences are significant. Europe is losing an external force that historically encouraged political cohesion and moderation at precisely the moment when internal challenges are becoming more serious. Migration-related tensions remain politically important, while Russia continues to represent a major external security threat. In this environment, ideological social debates increasingly compete with more pragmatic concerns: energy security, internal stability, economic growth, defence capability and access to advances in Artificial Intelligence.

These pressures nevertheless create incentives for the collective West to cooperate. Increasingly, the collective West can be understood as a network of countries operating under the NATO security umbrella, with Sweden’s accession to NATO representing one of the clearest recent examples of the consolidation of this security architecture (NATO, 2024).

The Russian threat therefore remains an important force promoting Western cooperation. At the same time, China’s rise is creating additional incentives for strategic cooperation with Japan and Taiwan, while East Asian states themselves continue to strengthen their defence capabilities as concerns over a possible Taiwan crisis become more acute (Reuters, 2026a).

Russia, Ukraine and the Politics of Power Projection

For Russia, the ability to project power remains essential not only externally but internally. The political legitimacy of the Russian state is closely connected to its ability to present itself as a major power. From this perspective, the war in Ukraine also serves a domestic political function: complex social and economic problems can be subordinated to the requirements of national security, while even limited territorial gains can be presented as evidence that continued sacrifice is justified (The Strategy Bridge, 2019).

The subsequent integration of occupied Ukrainian territories into Russian political structures illustrates this dynamic. Elections and administrative arrangements conducted in Russian-controlled Ukrainian territories have been condemned by European governments and their partners as illegitimate attempts to consolidate annexation (RFI, 2026).

Yet an interesting contrast emerges. Political consolidation of this kind is criticised by the collective West, while its principal power, the United States, is itself pursuing an increasingly consolidated view of its own strategic sphere. This development can be understood partly through what has been described as an updated or “Donroe” interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: a policy focused less on universal international management and more on securing America’s immediate strategic, economic and technological interests (Atlas Institute, 2026).

The United States can pursue such a strategy because it enjoys advantages that few other states possess.

The first is energy.

American energy requirements are increasingly supported by technological innovation, including the development of small modular reactors, which Washington regards as a potentially important element of future energy production and energy security (U.S. Department of Energy). At the same time, geopolitical instability in the Middle East has strengthened the profitability and strategic significance of petroleum refining, demonstrating that the possession of crude resources alone is insufficient without the infrastructure necessary to transform them into usable energy products (Financial Times, 2026).

The second advantage is computing capacity.

The United States possesses an enormous and rapidly expanding network of data centres. This infrastructure provides one of the foundations for Artificial Intelligence research and development, where access to computing power increasingly determines which states and companies can develop advanced models at scale (Yahoo Finance, 2026).

In the geopolitical environment now emerging, data infrastructure is becoming comparable in strategic importance to more traditional industrial infrastructure. Countries with large computing capacity, reliable energy supplies and access to advanced semiconductors possess a significant advantage in the development of AI and other computational technologies.

The Dollar Enters the Digital Economy

The United States also remains the world’s leading financial power, even in an international environment commonly described as increasingly multipolar.

The GENIUS Act, signed into law in 2025, established a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins, digital currencies whose value is linked to conventional assets such as the U.S. dollar (The White House, 2025). The significance of the legislation extends beyond cryptocurrency regulation. By providing a legal framework for dollar-denominated stablecoins, Washington is potentially extending the reach of the dollar into new digital financial networks.

Further proposed regulation by the U.S. Federal Reserve in September 2026 strengthened this direction by outlining reserve and regulatory requirements for supervised stablecoin issuers (Reuters, 2026b).

Taken together, these developments may represent an intermediate stage toward a financial environment in which dollar-linked digital assets function increasingly like digital fiat instruments. They should not necessarily be confused with an official U.S. central-bank digital currency, but the strategic consequence may still be considerable: digital financial markets that initially appeared capable of bypassing traditional monetary systems may instead reinforce the international role of the dollar.

The key question is therefore not whether cryptocurrency will replace conventional money, but whether the United States will succeed in incorporating digital finance into an extended dollar-based financial system.

Russia’s Infrastructure Constraint

Russia provides an important contrast.

Russian petroleum refineries have become increasingly exposed to Ukrainian military attacks. Some facilities have operated below capacity, while others have temporarily suspended operations after strikes on critical infrastructure (The Guardian, 2026). This demonstrates that possessing large petroleum reserves is not sufficient. Crude oil must be refined, transported and distributed for an economy to function effectively, particularly during periods of increased seasonal demand.

The same structural problem can be observed in computing infrastructure. Russia’s data-centre industry is expanding, and investment in new facilities continues (TAdviser, 2026). Nevertheless, the difference in scale between Russian and American computing infrastructure remains substantial. Estimates suggest that the United States operates several thousand data centres, while Russia operates fewer than two hundred (Visual Capitalist, 2026).

Raw numbers alone cannot accurately measure computing power. The size, efficiency, hardware and network integration of facilities are equally important. Nevertheless, the disparity illustrates the practical infrastructure constraints Russia faces when attempting to compete in advanced AI, cloud computing and other data-intensive technologies. It also does not account for the additional computing infrastructure operated by American companies and allied states outside U.S. territory.

Digital currency is potentially one area in which the competitive environment is more open. Russia’s political and economic centralisation may even provide certain advantages in implementing state-led financial infrastructure. The concept of Russia as a “sovereign democracy,” developed during the Putin era, has always placed substantially greater emphasis on sovereignty than on liberal-democratic pluralism (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

Russia’s original scepticism toward cryptocurrencies has consequently softened as their usefulness for international transactions and sanctions circumvention has become more apparent. Yet even digital currencies ultimately depend upon infrastructure. Regardless of future reductions in the energy intensity of cryptocurrency technologies, data-centre capacity will remain central to the digital economy.

Rubio’s European Tour and the Greek Node

The European tour of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio from 5 to 8 October 2026 should be understood within this wider strategic context. Energy relevance and military cooperation are increasingly being treated as complementary components of a country’s strategic value to the United States.

Among the countries included in the tour, Finland, Greece and Portugal, Greece appears particularly significant because of its role at the intersection of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and NATO’s southeastern flank.

In Athens, Rubio is expected to co-chair the sixth round of the U.S.–Greece Strategic Dialogue, continuing a bilateral process that began in 2018 (in.gr, 2026). The talks are expected to focus on defence cooperation, energy infrastructure and wider regional connectivity.

The Great Sea Interconnector, designed to link the electricity systems of Greece and Cyprus and potentially extend toward Israel, represents one important component of this emerging regional architecture. At the same time, U.S. LNG exports moving through the Vertical Gas Corridor offer a potential alternative to Russian gas for Southeast and Central Europe. Greece’s first long-term LNG supply arrangements with the United States further reinforce this direction (Reuters, 2025).

Greece is simultaneously developing a wider system of regional electricity interconnections. The proposed GREGY project would connect Greece and Egypt through a high-voltage submarine electricity cable, allowing renewable electricity generated in North Africa to reach European markets (European Commission).

A second major interconnection project involves Italy. Greece and Italy have advanced plans for a new approximately €1.9 billion subsea electricity connection designed to strengthen energy exchanges between the two countries and reinforce the integration of European electricity markets (Offshore Energy, 2025).

To the north, Greece is already connected to Bulgaria through cross-border electricity infrastructure, while integration with Romania further strengthens a north–south energy corridor linking the Eastern Mediterranean with Southeast Europe (European Commission/Futurium).

Within this framework, Greece has the potential to emerge as a regional energy hub.

The location in Thessaloniki of SEleNe CC, the Regional Coordination Centre for Southeast Europe, reinforces the country’s role in the integration and coordination of electricity systems across Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean (SEleNe CC, 2025).

Greece is also expected to attract further investment from American companies in data-centre infrastructure, strengthening the digital component of the bilateral economic relationship (Parapolitika, 2026). If implemented at sufficient scale, such investments could connect Greece’s geographical position in energy and transport networks with the growing strategic importance of computational infrastructure.

Economic cooperation alone, however, is not sufficient.

The current U.S. administration has made clear that strategic partners are also expected to contribute to regional security. Greece’s existing defence relationship with the United States, formalised and expanded through the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, places it in an increasingly important position on NATO’s southeastern flank (U.S. Department of State).

Updating and deepening this defence framework would therefore complement Greece’s emerging economic and energy role. The country would no longer function simply as an energy transit point but as a regional actor combining infrastructure, military capability and political alignment.

Conclusion

The broader argument is relatively straightforward. Wasteful public expenditure undermines trust in government and contributes to social disruption. States that lose the confidence of their citizens find it increasingly difficult to finance large public programmes, sustain defence commitments and maintain political cohesion.

At the same time, disconnecting from technologically advanced strategic partners such as the United States would make it considerably more difficult for European states to remain competitive in the emerging economic environment. The United States continues to occupy a unique position in technological innovation and remains at the forefront of Artificial Intelligence development.

Similarly, allowing migration to remain unchecked and poorly regulated risks creating prolonged political and social instability. Immigration policy cannot be treated separately from questions of integration, citizenship and social cohesion.

The role of the state as a security provider must also not be overlooked. Economic capability and social stability are ultimately connected to the existence of armed forces capable of protecting energy infrastructure, digital systems and territorial security.

Religion is also becoming more visible within contemporary American conservative politics. Initiatives announced by Secretary Pete Hegseth concerning religious affairs within the U.S. defence establishment indicate that secularisation is not necessarily regarded as the only direction of institutional development and that questions of social cohesion are increasingly being viewed through religious as well as political categories (U.S. Department of War, 2026).

For Christian conservatives in particular, religious and social coherence is increasingly presented as a defence against radical political movements, including Islamist forms of political mobilisation. In this worldview, social cohesion, economic strength and military capability reinforce one another.

A capable military force, secure energy supplies, sufficient computing infrastructure and clear economic priorities would therefore allow the collective West, under continued U.S. leadership, to preserve the strategic initiative.

The international system may be described increasingly as multipolar, but the practical distribution of power tells a more complicated story. The United States retains disproportionate advantages in energy, finance, technological innovation, Artificial Intelligence and alliance structures.

How these advantages will ultimately reshape the global system remains uncertain.

One area, however, deserves particular attention: stablecoins and the possibility that digital finance will not weaken the dollar-based system, but instead provide the mechanism through which it is extended into the next stage of the global economy.

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